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I. INTRODUCTION 
The threat to person and property from crime is a central problera of 
social concern in the United States today. But crime is not a new problem. 
"Crime in the streets" and "the need for law-and-order" have been slogans 
used by politicians at least since the early 196O's to exploit popular fears 
of crime; however, the study of crime as a social phenomenon has played a 
prominent role in American sociology throughout the twentieth century. 
With the surge in reported crime in the 196O's, considerable public attention 
was focussed on the control of crime, through President Lyndon B. Johnson's 
Cormnission on Law Enforcement and Adrainistration of Justice, and the subse-
quent implementation of the Commission's recommendations. At the same time 
economists began to study law enforcement as an economic problem involving 
the allocation of scarce resources (e.g. see Becker, 1968). 
The punishment of criminal offenders has played an important role in 
both the economic and sociological approaches to the control of crime. 
Although retribution was long considered to be a primary rationale for 
punishment, this view has given way, at least pa3rtially, to the position that 
punishment of offenders will lead to a subsequent reduction in or prevention 
of crime. The possible mechanisms for the prevention of crime through 
punishment, other than retribution, are several: 
i) 
ii) 
Incapacitation. By removing an offender from society for some 
period of time, we can prevent that offender from repeating his 
offense or committing other ones while he is not in contact with 
society. 
Education. By administering punishment for anti-social acts 
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(such as crimes), government and its agencies achieve a moral 
and educational effect on society as a whole. 
iii) Rehabilitation. Through the use of education, correctional 
iv) 
"treatment", or vocational training during imprisonment, society 
attempts to "change" offenders so that they will not commit 
crimes in the future. 
Deterrence. By enforcing punishment on an offender, society 
warns the offender, and the community at large, and thus inhibits 
the offender or others in the community from engaging in criminal 
activity in the future. 
When it is the sanctioned offender who is inhibited from committing crimes 
by the actual experience of punishment we speak of specific deterrence, 
whereas when individuals other than the sanctioned offender are so inhibited 
we speak of general deterrence. 
With regard the deterrent effect of punishment we need to make a further 
distinction, suggested by Zimring and Hawkins (1973), between absolute and 
marginal deterrence: 
"The problem of absolute deterrence relates to the question, Does this 
particular criminal sanction deter? The problem of marginal deter-
rence relates to such questions as, Would a more severe penalty 
attached to this criminal prohibition more effectively deter? In the 
capital punishment debate the issue is not that of absolute deterrence -
whether the death penalty is a deterrent. It is that of marginal 
deterrence - whether it is a more effective deterrent than the alter-
native sanction of long imprisonment." 
(Zimring and Hawkins, 1973, p. 14) 
, . 
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Most people can accept the notion of the absolute deterrence effect of many 
forms of punishment. For example, the removal of all sanctions for a crime 
such as robbery, most would agree, would lead to an increase in the rate at which 
robberies are committed; others might argue that the reason for the increase 
is not the removal of threat of punishment but rather the removal of the 
educational and moral value the punishment provided for society as a whole. 
The issue which is explored in this paper and which has been the subject of 
recent concern is that of marginal deterrence, i.e. we are interested in the· 
potential effects of shifts in the level of sanctions on subsequent criminal 
behavior. 
Measuring the effects of these different mechanisms through which 
punishment might prevent crime is a far more difficult task than it may at 
first seem. As we just noted, it is often difficult to separate the educa~ 
tional and general deterrent components of the effects of punishment. Similarly, 
it is difficult to separate out the effects of incapacitation from those of 
deterrence. The difficulty is in fact one of explaining exactly what the 
mechanism of incapacitation actually entails. 
A simple-minded argument to explain the effect of incapacitation might 
go as follows. Suppose we imprison a 20 year-old male for a period of two 
years for committing the crime of burglary. Then, if that offender had been 
committing burglaries at the rate of, say, 12 per year, the simple fact of 
his removal from society for two years will prevent the commission of 24 
burglaries. We would then wish to remove these 24 burglaries in any modelling 
we do from the overall effect of the two years of punishment on the future 
burglary rate. 
Even if we knew the rate of offending for each imprisoned offender, 
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the calculation in this argwnent may completely distort the actual effects 
of incapacitating various individuals. In the case of the 20 year-old 
burglar, we need to know more about the nature and circumstances of his 
offenses. If he were a member of a group of burglars, all of whom work 
together, then his imprisonment may not have any effect at all on the 
number of burglaries committed by the group. Indeed, if he was arrested 
and convicted because he was the worst burglar in the group, the other 
members of the group might well recruit a superior replacement, and thus 
the overall number of burglaries the group commits could easily increase. 
Reiss (1977) has persuasively argued that the interpenetrating social 
networks of offenders and their victims need to be better understood 
before we can make any serious attempts to separate out the effects of 
incapacitation from those of deterrence. At the same time no empirical 
model for measuring the deterrent effect of punishment can be complete 
unless it also includes the related incapacitation effect. (See also the 
discussion of incapacitation in the report of the National Academy of 
Sciences Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects 
(Blumstein, 1978)). 
Let us explore the mechanism of deterrence somewhat furthero The 
effects of deterrence can be thought of only in the context of those who 
are likely to commit a crime, and who are influenced by the threat of punish-
ment for that crime if apprehended and convicted. The nature and extent of 
punishment can have no effect on those who do not need to be deterred from 
criminal activities, and on those who are not or cannot be deterred by the 
threat of punishment. Thus,to measure the deterrent effect of punishment, 
we need to attempt to get at those on the margin of criminal activityo The 
size of the group of individuals on the margin limits the po~ential deterrent 
i 
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effects of any form of punishment. Since economic theory so often deals 
with the marginal effects of various policy changes, the appeal of cri~e 
and punishment as an application of economic modelling is great. What 
remains to be seen is whether such economic models are consistent with 
empirical observations. 
In this paper we review some recent attempts to develop econometric 
models for assessing the deterrent effect of punishment on crime, as well 
as analyses carried out to validate these models. First, in Section II 
we discuss the possible types of empirical investigations that might be 
used to study deterrence. Then, in Section III we briefly describe the 
Becker-Ehrlich econometric model for crime and punishment. Section IV 
describes some of the general problems in the empirical implementation of 
this model. Then, in Sections V and VI, we outline the published empirical 
tests of the model along with some of our own reanalyses. Section V deals 
with cross-sectional data for 1960 and 1970, Section VI deals primarily 
with longitudinal data for homicide, and includes a special look at the 
deterrent effects of capital punishment. 
Finally, Section VII contains own conclusions regarding the empirical 
evidence on deterrence. They can be summarized briefly as follows: 
(a) The Becker-Ehrlich model has glaring shortcomings, and when 
examined critically does not lead to the claimed testable hypotheses 
regarding the effect of punishment of crime. 
(b) The use of the Becker-Ehrlich model for aggregate data requires 
extensive justification that has never been giveno 
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(c) The crime and imprisonment data used to empirically examine 
the Becker-Ehrlich model are so untrustworthy as to render any 
serious analysis meaningless. 
(d) The empirical implementations of the Becker-Ehrlich models 
are badly flawed and have extremely grave statistical shortcomings 
and most published conclusions from them are not to be trusted. 
(e) Even if one accepts the Becker-Ehrlich model, and Ehrlich's 
choice of data to implement it (which we do not), Ehrlich's 
affi~tive conclusions regarding the deterrent effect of 
punishment on crime in general, and of capital punishment on murder 
in.particular, do not stand up to careful statist~cal scrutiny. 
Thus our conclusions are in agreement with those of the National Academy 
of Sciences Panel on Deterrence and Incapacitation: there is no 
empirical evidence to warrant an affirmative conclusion regarding the 
deterrent effect of punishment in general, and the available studies on 
homicide provide no useful evidence on the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment. Moreover, given the limitations of aggregate data on crime and 
incarceration, we believe that much more attention in the future should be 
focussed on studies of individual criminal behavior. We do not expect any 
empirical research, at least in the near future, to provide definitive 
evidence on the deterrent effects of capital punishment. 
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II. POSSIBLE VEHICLES FOR STUDYING DETERRENCE 
As with many other social phenomena, the relationship between punish-
ment and crime can,in principle, be explored either in an experimental 
setting or by an observational study. 
In a randomized controlled field trial, experimental units ---
individuals, collections of individuals, political or legal jurisdictions, 
etc. --- are randomly assigned to treatment groups, and are then carefully 
followed to assess the actual effects of the treatment. The randomization 
allows the experimenter to avoid the dangers of self-selection, and it 
allows for the c9ntrol of variables not included directly into the design of 
the field trial. The "controlled" nature of such field trials implies that 
the choice of treatment for an experimental unit is that of the investigator, 
and that at least two treatments (or levels of treatment) are being compared 
(see Gilbert, Light, and Mosteller, 1975, for further discussion). The 
randomized controlled field trial is the most demanding of all research 
strategies for investigating social innovations, but the increased reliabi-
lity gained from a randomized trial can often far outstrip the costs. For 
a field trial involving deterrence the treatments would involve different 
levels of punishment and/or the threat of punishment. Unfortunately, there 
have been few examples of randomized controlled field trials dealing with 
deterrence. Zimring and Hawkins (1973) note that "[i]t is difficult to 
conceive of an acceptable experiment in which, after random assiglliilent, the 
severity of sanctions threatened for a violation of a particular criminal 
law was varied between the two groups." While we do not completely agree 
with their statement, we do recognize the many legal and possibly moral 
road blocks to careful experimentation on deterrence. Because of this 
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difficulty in mounting experiments, most investigators resort to alternative 
research strategies, two of which are highly prominent. 
In one of these approaches the researcher attempts to assess the effect 
of a change in the level of sanctions by comparing reported crime rates before 
and after the change in a given jurisdiction. To reduce the potential biases 
and errors of such an approach, investigators often compare the change in rates 
with those in other jurisdictions iu which no changes in the level of sanctions 
took place. For a recent discussion of such "natural" experiments with regard 
to the deterrent effect of capital punishment, see Baldus and Cole (1975)0 
The other approach to the measurement of deterrent effects of punishment 
is the gathering of aggregate data on crime and punishment, as well as on 
various social and economic variables, and then the study of the variations 
in crime that occur either among jurisdictions or over time. This is the 
approach adopted by Ehrlich (1973, 1975a, 1977b) in his attempt to develop 
an econometric model for the effect of varying sanctions, and the inherent 
difficulties in this approach are the primary subject of this paper. 
.,; 
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III. THE BECKER-EHRLICH MODEL FOR CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
Becker (1968) introduces his attempt to model crime and its optL-nal 
control by noting that '"crime' is an economically important activity, or 
'industry', not withstanding the almost total neglect by economists." 
His model involves basically five behavioral relationships which he claims 
underlie the costs of crime: the relations between (1) the number of 
offenses and their cost, (2) the number of offenses and the punishments 
meted out, (3) the number of offenses, arrests, and convictions and the 
public expenditures on police and courts, (4) the number of convictions and 
the costs of imprisonments or alternative punishments, (5) the number of 
offenses and the private expenditures on protection and apprehension. 
We do not discuss (5) any further here since it plays no role in Ehrlich's 
empirical implementation of Becker's model, nor in the bulk of the 
related literature we consider. 
Becker's basic premise is that criminals maximize their expected gains 
(according to some utility function) frora illicit activity. A person commits 
an offense if the expected utility he will receive exceeds the utility he 
would receive by engaging in other activities. Thus the criminal's decision 
is based on benefits and costs of both a monetary and psychic nature. 
According to Ehrlich (1973) an individual allocates a fixed amount of 
time among legal and illegal income-generating activities. The effects of 
this time allocation are introduced only implicitly by Ehrlich th~ough 
the effects of this time allocation on wealth. From the basic model 
Ehrlich goes on to derive some behavioral implications such as: an increase 
in the probability of apprehension and punishment with no change in other 
variables reduces the incentive to participate in illegitimate activities. 
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Block and Reineke (1975) have examined Ehrlich's model with great 
care and have shown that if the allocation of time is introduced explicitly 
into the utility analysis, the behavioral implications of the model derived 
by Ehrlich do not necessarily hold. Moreover, they note that, contrary 
to the assumptions of Becker and Ehrlich, it is not necessarily true that 
monetary equivalents to labor and penalty attributes of an offense exist. 
As a result propositions regarding the deterrent effect of punishment 
become empirical questions, rather than theoretic consequences subject 
to empirical validation. 
Implicit in the utility analysis of Becker, Ehrlich, and others is 
that criminals or potential criminals are rational decision makers in that 
they make their decisions according to a list of axioms. The 
appropriateness of such an economic model of crime is clearly open to 
question. For example Avio and Clark (1976) state that: "It would be 
difficult to argue that perpetrators of violent crimes behave according 
to the usual set(s) of axioms •••• Murders involving some form of 
premeditation and motivated by economic gain might be consistent with the 
economic model. Most murders, however, occur in the home, involve members 
of the same family, and seem unpremeditated." 
The net result of this econometric modelling is a functional relationship 
between the number of offenses committed by individual j, 0., to his 
J 
probability of conviction, p., to his punishment given conviction, f., 
J J 
to his rate of return {benefits) if he successfully commits the crime, 
w .. (i stands for !llegal returns), the rate of returns from alternative 
1J 
legal activities, wLj (L stands for !,egal returns), the probability of legal 
unemployment, uLj' and a vector of other variables, _y_j: 
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0. = O.(p., f., w .. , w,. ., u 11 ., v.). J J J J 1J ~J ~J -J (3 .1) 
The function (3.1) is the one discussed by Ehrlich (1973), and is 
simply an elaboration of Becker's supply of offenses function. To arrive 
at (3.1), one must adopt many untested and possibly untestable assu.~ptions 
regarding criminal behavior and its determinants. 
There is little or no discussion by Becker or Ehrlich regarding those 
•:economic" variables not included in (3.1), nor do they provide support for 
the forms of the variables appropriate for inclusion for the empirical 
validation of the model. This is a serious matter. No amount of utility 
theory, systems of partial differential equations, Kuhn-Tucker first-ord~~ 
optimality conditions, and analogies to the supply and demand for bread 
and butter (see Ehrlich and Gibbons, 1977) can make up for the logical 
leaps that lead to the specification of (3.1). 
The first step adopted by Ehrlich and others in making the model 
of expression (3.1) suitable for empirical examination is the aggregation 
of data across individuals. Thus Ehrlich uses the aggregate function 
01, = O*(p*, f*, wt, wf, uj, ~*) (3.2) 
where O* is the aggregate number of offenses in a particular 
jurisdiction, p* is the aggregate probability of conviction, and so on. 
The justification for such aggregation typically tests on the assumption 
either that the parameters used to specify the relation (3.1) are constant 
across individuals, or that the parameters are stochastic coning from some 
common distribution. To actually justify the aggregation, one further 
needs to specify a specific functional form~ For example, suppose logo. is 
J 
linearly related to the logarithms of the variables on the left-hand side 
of (3.1). Then, if the coefficients are the same across individuals, the 
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aggregate number of offenses, O*, is related to the geometric means of 
the individual values for the other variables. Thus the justification of 
functional form must ultimately be established at the individual rather 
than the aggregate level. Since aggregation also takes place over time, 
we also need to assume some form of constancy or at a minimum stochastic 
stationarity of the parameters in the functional specification (see 
e.g. Kuh and Welsch, 1976). 
One of the few empirical examinations of a related functional specification 
at the individual was carried out by Witte (1977). Her analyses show the 
importance of individual sociodemographic variables in the specification, 
such as race, as well as other individual variables such as age, and are 
supportive of arguments indicating the inappropriateness of the aggregate 
data used by most investigators in this area. 
Alternatives to the Becker-Ehrlich model exist. These are based on 
concepts such as the saturation of the resources of the criminal justice 
system (P. Cook, 1977), and "homeostasis," the apparent stability 
of -imprisonment, and effective prison capacity (Blumstein and Cohen, 
1973; Nagin, 1977). While we do not directly discuss the eQpirical 
examination of these alternatives, we note that they cast doubt on 
Ehrlich's claims regarding marginal deterrent effects of punishment. 
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IV. MOVING TO EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE BECKER-EHRLICH MODEL 
To move from the aggregate supply of offenses model of expression 
(3.2) to an empirical study of deterrence one needs to 
(a) specify in detail the "other" var.iables to be included 
J. 
as part of the vector;!_; 
(b) describe how each of the variables is to be measured, 
(c) specify the actual functional form of the relationshipo 
Ehrlich (1973, 1975a) provides a priori specifications for (a) and 
(c) which we call into question in our reanalyses of his data. Thus 
we defer our discussion of these matters to later sections of this 
paper. 
The actual rate of offending in any community for any specific 
crime during a specific time period is not known. What we have 
available are data on offenses reported to the police. Ehrlich 
(1973, 1975a) as a substitute for O* (the actual offense rate) uses 
Q/N, where Q is the nLUilber of offenses reported to the police and 
recorded by them for a jurisdiction, and N is an estimate of the 
population size for that jurisdiction. It is well known that not 
all offenses committed are reported to the police. Estimates of the 
ratio of Q to Q*, the true number of offenses, vary from as low as 10% 
for rape to close to 100% for murder. In the case of automobile 
theft there have been occasional reports that Q exceeds Q* because of 
non-thefts reported to the police for insurance purposes. 
Unfortunately, the ratio QJQ,': can vary dramatically from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, Skogan (1976) notes that 
in the 26 city victimization surveys conducted under the auspices of 
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National Crime Survey Q**/Q* (where Q** is the number of crimes reported 
to the police) for robbery varied from 52% to 76%.t The estimates of 
the ratio of the number of crimes appearing on police records (i.e. Q) 
to the number actually reported (i.e. Q**) for these 26 cities, however, 
varied from 19% to 100%! 
The quantity Q is also used by Ehrlich to get a measure of p* the 
aggregate subjective probability of punishment (i.e. apprehension and 
imprisonment). He uses C/Q as an estimate of p* where Q is the number 
of recorded crimes in a given period of time, and C is the number of 
offenders imprisoned during the same time period for the same jurisdiction. 
There are two problems here. 
First, for a fixed period of time and a given jurisdiction it is 
impossible to determine which of the offenses that get included in Q 
ultimately lead to apprehension and imprisonment. Individuals are 
not tracked over time through the criminal justice system, and the 
aggregate figures for those imprisoned that are available for jurisdictions 
such as states include individuals whose crimes may have been committed 
in other states, and include offenders whose crimes took place possibly 
several years prior to incarceration. Thus the use contemporaneous 
values of C and Q by state can lead to sizeable discrepancies between 
C/Q and p*, which can be shown to vary from state to state in occasionally 
very strange ways. We discuss this problem further in the next section. 
tThese rates are subject to substantial sampling error, and some of 
the variability can be attributed to this source. 
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Second, Q now appears on both the left and right hand sides of 
the operational version of equation (3.2). As is noted in the report 
of the National Academy of Science (Blumstein and White, 1978), 
variation in the error in measuring Q*, the true number of crimes 
connnitted can induce a spurious negative relation bet~een the offense 
rate and the punishment rate, when no such relationship exists. Klein, 
Forst, and Filatov (1978) demonstrate how such errors can induce a 
similar bias in the estimated relation between murder and execution 
rates. 
The source of the data used by Ehrlich and other to analyze the 
deterrent effects of punishment in the United States is the Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR) produced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). UCR data are collected as part of a voluntary reporting system 
involving state and local law enforcement agencies, and are based on 
crimes recorded by these agencies. In addition to the problems of 
reporting and recording offenses noted earlier, UCR rates may seriously 
distort the level of offenses because multiple crimes with possibly 
multiple victims often are recorded as single offenses. 
Since the beginning of the UCR program in 1933 both the number and 
the percentage of law enforcement agencies reporting to the FBI have 
increased dramatically. Moreover, reporting practices have also 
evolved, and officials generally agree that a larger proportion of 
offenses made known to the police now get reported to the FBI than was 
the case in the past. Finally, although the proportion of units reporting 
has increased over time, specific police departments that are once 
included in the UCR data base may not be included at later points in 
time for one of several reasons. 
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The UCR data used by Ehrlich for his cross-sectional analyses 
discussed in the next section are based on the UCR Reports for the 
years of interest. The data used in his national longitudinal analysis 
of murder, discussed here in Section VI, are not the reported rates for 
each point in time. Rather, they consist of FBI estimates of what the 
reported crime rates would have been had the units included in the UCR 
system been the same as in 1972. Unfortunately there is no published 
description of the procedure used by the FBI to reestimate the rates. 
We have no way to assess the appropriateness of the FBI's reestimation 
procedure, but it is reasonable to conclude that it is likely to produce 
additional biases and increased variability to an already poor measure 
of crime. 
We do not believe that UCR data collected prior to 1960 merit 
serious attention since they are almost completely unreliable, that is 
they are subject to enormous errors and biases. Any substantive 
conclusions one might draw from the analysis of these data are not to 
be trusted. Even the FBI no longer wishes to report data prior to 1960 
because of doubts regarding their validity. We also have serious 
reservations regarding the quality and validity of the 1960 UCR data 
used by Ehrlich and others. Nonetheless, we discuss the 1960 data and 
national longitudinal UCR data for murder from 1933 through 1969 in the 
following two sections. 
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V. THE ANALYSES OF U.S. CROSS-SECTIONAL CRIME DATA 
In this section we discuss some recent analyses that have attempted 
to empirically examine the Becker-Ehrlich econometric model of crime 
and punishment using cross-sectional data for the United States. We 
have attempted to replicate some of these results and we report on our 
findings in this regard along with some additional analyses. 
A. Ehrlich's 1960 Data 
Ehrlich (1973) analyzed 1960 data from 47 states. The states 
omitted from the analyses were Alaska, Hawaii, and New Jersey (see 
Vandaele (1978)). New Jersey was omitted because certain key variables 
could not be obtained. The listing and definitions of all variables 
in Ehrlich's study are given in Table 1. 
Table 1 goes about here 
To implement the aggregate model of expression (3.2), Ehrlich 
chose to use a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
b b b b4 b5 b6 b b 
. (_qN) = A (£.) 1 T*2 W 3 X (NW) 7 A 8 Q V14 Ll4 14 
where (i) Q/N is the operational attempt to estimate the offense 
rate, O*, 
(ii) C/N is the operational attempt to estimate the probabilitv 
of punishment, p*, 
(5 .1) 
(iii) r! the average time served by prisonE--r·: in state prisons, is 
the empirical measure ~F fh, the punishment given conviction, 
(iv) W, the median family income, and X, the percentage of 
families below the median income, are used as replacements 
for the differential monetary returns of crime relative to 
legal alternatives, i.e. wt and wz, 
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(v) v14 , the male urban unemployment rate for ages 14-24, and 
L14 , the labor force participation rate for this same group, 
are used in lieu of uz, the probability of legal unemployment, 
(vi) NW, the percentage of non-whites, and A14, the percentage of 
males in the 14-24 age group, are the "other" variables, !*, 
(vii) A, and b. for i = 1,2, ••• , 8 are parameters to be estimated, 
l. 
(viii) e is a random error term. 
The relationship among the variables in (5.1) is multiplicative, 
and we must take logarithms of both sides of the equation to produce 
linearity (we use natural logarithms, denoted by ln): 
ln(~) = b0 + b1ln(~) + b2lnT* + h3lnW + b4lnX + b5lnv14 
As a result of statistical analyses, Ehrlich cencladed that v14 , L14, 
and A14 had virtually no effect on the rest of the estimated equation 
and so they were dropped to yield: 
ln(i) = b0 + b1ln(i) + b2lnT* + b3lnW + h4lnX + h7lnNW + e. 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
Ehrlich uses a simultaneous equations approach in which the crime 
rate, Q/N, the probability of imprisonment, C/Q, and the amount of police 
expenditures per capita, E/N, are simultaneously determined, or 
endogenous variables. Ehrlich does not ·present a system of structural 
equations for the entire system but only gives the one determining the 
crime rate, i.e. equation (5o3). In this system, however, it is the 
variables W, X, and NW (the only socio-economic variables included) 
that ,.identify" equation (5.3) and allow for the estimation of the key 
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coefficients of the punishment variables, b1 and b2 • Fisher and Nagin 
(1978) have noted that using socio-economic variables to identify 
simultaneous relationships can be hazardouso We address this point 
below, but we emphasize again that Ehrlich does not present his entire 
system so it is impossible for anyone to completely judge his 
specification. 
Ehrlich estimates the parameters in (5.3) for each of the seven 
basic crime types and for various combinations of crime. Estimates are 
obtained by two-stage least squares ,and also by the method of "seemingly 
unrelated regressions" due to Zellner (1962). In all cases the coefficient 
of most interest, b1 , has a negative estimate and is judged to be 
significantly different from O (based upon its t-ratio being larger 
than 2). We give Ehrlich's two-stage least squares estimates of the 
coefficients in Table 2. 
Table 2 goes about here 
Ehrlich's final conclusion, based on these analyses, is that 
these 1960 data provide strong support for the theory that sanctions 
deter crime. We take issue with this conclusion. We present detailed 
connnents on these analyses, but first we mention a few key points 
relating to model formulation and the statistical methods used. 
(i) Ehrlich assumed a priori the specification of equation (5.1), 
thus leading him to estimate a relationship that was linear 
in the logarithmic scale, i.e. equations (5.2) or (5.3). 
He made no attempt to check the appropriateness of this 
assumption, or to assess the overall goodness of fit of his 
modelo Many alternatives are available which are consistent 
with the original econometric formulation. 
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(ii) As noted above the use of the variables, W, X, and ~1~ to 
identify the crime rate equation, (So3), is highly 
suspect. 
(iii) No justification is given for the use of Wand X in place 
of the variables measuring the differential monetary returns 
of crime. 
(iv) When fallible measures are used for key variables in a 
regression or simultaneous equation model, it does not 
suffice to substitute then directly into the model, as 
Ehrlich did with equation (4.1). The problems of dealing 
with models where there are errors in the variables are 
well-known (e.g. see Sprent, 1969 or Zellner, 1971). 
(v) There is a special statistical technology especially 
· suitable to problems where there are multiple indicators 
available for given unobservable variables (see 
Joreskog, 1970 for a general formulation, and Bielby, 
Hauser and Featherman, 1977, for an illustrative application)o 
Ehrlich simply ignores this matter. 
(vi) The equations for all of the crillles include the monetary 
variables Wand X, even those for violent crimes such as 
murder, assault and rape. We see no justification for this. 
(vii) The equations for each crime type are analyzed separately 
and not linked. In our view a more realistic r.iodel would 
relate crime rates to one another given the known tendencies 
of career criminals to substitute one type for another 
(eog. see Greenwood and Petersilia, 1977)0 
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Vandaele (1978) reanalyzed Ehrlich's 1960 data, incorporating a 
number of different model specifications as well as an attempt to 
identify possible outliers, i.e. states whose data do not fit the 
pattern of the remainder. His analyses lead him to essentially the 
same conclusions as Ehrlich. We merely outline here some of the high-·. 
lights of Vandaele's work. He supports Ehrlich's use of weighted least 
squares but notes that weighting the variables does not have any real 
effect on the conclusions. His analyses are also done in the logarithmic 
scale, although one set of estimates was obtained for a model in which i 
is in the log scale and all other variables are untransformed. The results 
of this analysis are not very different from the others. Two different 
models for the supply of offenses equation that Vandaele fits are the 
model of equation (5.3) where the reduced form contains only these 
6 variables in this model together with (~)59 , and 
ln(;-) = bO + b1lnP + b2lnT* + b3lnW + h4lnX + h5lnNW + h6lnv14 
+ b7lnL14 + h8lnA14 + b9lnSMSA + b101ru.~ + b11lnEd (5.4) 
where the reduced form includes only these variables in (5.4) together 
with (~)59 • The estimates of the coefficients of lnP and lnT for these 
two models are given in Table 3, along with estimates for the model in 
which the crime rate equation is identical to (5.3), but where (~)59 is 
used as an additional reduced form variable. Vandaele 1 s overall con-
clusion is that the inferences about deterrence are not sensitive to 
changes in the specification of the model. A careful examination of 
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Table 3 raises doubts about this point, to which we will return. 
Finally, Vandaele notes that some states (Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin) 
have recorded values for some variables that are inconsistent, e.g. the 
estimate of C/Q, the probability of conviction for assault in Yermont is 
given as 1.56. These are not mistakes in recording but result from 
the way in which the variables such as C/Q are defined (see Table 1). 
As we noted in Section IV the problems here include the lag between 
offenses and imprisonments as well as cross-overs between states. 
Redoing the analysis with certain of these states omitted, Vandaele 
claimed that the results are not substantially changed. He concludes 
that, although the question of what is the proper model specification 
needs to be studied further, the fact that the estimates do not depend 
on the specification lends support to the theory that sanctions are an 
effective deterrent. 
Using the data reported in Vandaele's paper we have reestimated 
the parameters for the equations determining murder and burglary. In 
both cases we were able to duplicate Vandaele's estimates up to 
roundoff error. For these two crimes our findings agree with those 
of Vandaele in that the burglary estimates are insensitive to changes 
in specification while those for murder are not. We have done the 
analysis, in both cases, using a model that is linear in the original 
scale and found that the results are consistent with the logarithmic 
scale. The residual analysis (see e~g. Daniel and Wood, 1972) indicates 
that either of the models fit the data adequatelya We also agree with 
Vandaele's findings that deletion of "the states with values of C/Q greater 
than 1 does not change the results, but we do not agree that this is not 
a problem. 
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Table 3 goes about here 
Vandaele has stated that his conclusions are not sensitive to 
changes in the specification of the modelo This is crucial since 
there is not nearly enough theoretical knowledge of the system to 
determine which a priori assumptions are correct. Indeed many are 
likely to be incorrect. Thus different estimates for different 
specifications would force us to do more thinking about the correct 
form. A careful examination of Table 3 shows that, especially for the 
violent crimes of murder, rape, and assault, the estimates do change for 
the four specifications described above. Note also that there was 
some instability in the estimates for murder and assault. Thus we do 
not agree with Vandaele's claim, and given the connnents of Fisher and 
Nagin (1978) concerning identification, this finding casts doubts on 
any inferences drawn. 
Continuing our analysis in a purely analytic framework, we note 
that multicollinearity is a serious problem in this data seto The 
correlation matrix indicates very high correlations among the socio-
economic variables. Our computations were done using a CDC 6600 computer 
and, although we did not run into any problems inverting matrices, it is 
well known that even a nearly singular design matrix can lead to unstable 
estimates of parameters·. Another problem is that of11outliers" or what 
would be more appropriately called influential observations (see 
R.D. Cook, 1977). These are points that are a large distance away from 
the "x-space" spanned by the other points .. Vandaele has just looked at 
univariate plots to detemine if any of these points are present but 
this may be very misleadingo Figure 1 shows a point which is clearly 
far from the others but the two univariate along the axes plots do not 
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show this at all. It would be very helpful in these analyses to have 
adapted some of Cook's techniques but we have been unable to do so. 
Figure 1 goes about here 
The most serious problem, however, lies with the data itself. We 
are trying to estimate effects of certain variables on others but we cannot 
observe what we desire. For instance, NW is actually 
the percentage of blacks in the population, not the percentage of non-
whites. If this variables is attempting to measure minorities then it may 
be very misleading. We will see below in a reanalysis of 1970 data that changes 
in the way some of the variables are measured can yield very different 
results. The most serious problem is that of measuring the probability 
of conviction, one of the keys to the analysis. Since it is determined by 
the ratio of the number of commitments to the number of offenses, this 
"probabilityn may be larger than 1. While Vandaele minimizes this by 
showing that states with probabilities larger than 1 do not make a 
difference, he misses the point. This variable is clearly not measuring 
what it is suppose to and there is no way of determining whether a value 
of C/Q equal to 0.1 is an accurate reflection of the probability of 
conviction in that state! We can all agree that an estimated probability 
of 1.6 is wrong because we know that probabilities cannot exceed one in 
value. When we observe estimated probabilities of conviction of 0.9 what 
are we to do? Why should we trust the estimates of magnitude 0.9 or 0.1 
any more than we trust those of 1.1 or 1.6? The problem may be that there 
are transitions between states which preclude using this measurement of 
the probability. At any rate, it seems impossible to seriously justify any 
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inferences made using this measure of sanction, especially since Ehrlich 
uses ln(C/Q) in his equation rather than C/Q. When C/Q is close to zero 
a small error in estimate is greatly magnified by taking logarithms. 
B. Forst's 1970 Data 
Forst (1976) presents analysis of 1970 cross-sectional dat~ that 
parallels that of Ehrlich. This analysis is based on data from all 50 
states plus Washington, D.C. A description of the variables used is 
given in Table 4. Many of these variables are similar to Ehrlich's 
but there are some important differences. 
Table 4 goes about here 
There are four variables that are measured differently in the two 
data sets: Forst measures the average length of prison sentence from 
the Statistical Abstract (1972) while Ehrlich uses National Prisoner 
Statistics; he uses YDSPR to measure income dispersion while Ehrlich uses 
the proportion of families earning below the median family income; he 
measures the proportion of persons between 18 and 20 years of age while 
Ehrlich uses the proportion between 14 and 24; he measures population 
density from Census data while Ehrlich uses SMSA, the proportion living in 
standard metropolitan statistical areas. In addition, Forst uses four 
variables for which there are no corresponding measures in Ehrlich's 
analysis; namely MIGR, BRHO, QJ, and AVTMP. We will see below that the first 
two of these prove to be quite important. 
Forst models the criminal justice system using a five-equation structure: 
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CR= f 1(PJ,AVSENT,QJ,MIGR,URB,BRHO,MFY,YDSPR,UM?L,TEEN,MALE,NWITE,Al:"TEHP) 
PJ = f 2 (POL$,CR,SOUTH,URB) 
(2) QJ = f 3 (YlPOP,SOUTH) (5.5) 
POL$ = f4(YIPOP,CRt-l) 
CCR$ = f 5 (YI POP, CRt-1) 
where each f. represents an affine function of the included variables. 
l. 
Two important distinctions between this model and Ehrlich's is that Forst considers 
police expenditure to be an exogenous variable (determined in his case by YIPOP 
and CRt_1) and, more importantly,.he uses considerably more variables to 
determine the crime rate. We also note that Forst analyzes only the aggregate 
crime rate, not the rates for individual crimes. 
Once again we will focus only upon the estimation of the crime rate, the first 
equation in (5.5). Forst·presents his analysis with the variables measure in: their 
original scale, i.e. the additive relationship as opposed t~ the multiplicative one 
assumed by Ehrlich. He states that this is the more appropriate model because of 
the higher R2 (a comment which is incorrect statistically). Another point of 
difference is that Ehrlich assumed that the variance of the errors decreased with N, 
state population, and hence he performed weighted least squares with hr 
as weights. Forst did not, empirically, find a need for such weighting 
and hence did not use one. At any rate we will see later that the weighting 
does not have much of an effect on the conclusions. 
Forst's estimated coefficients are given in Table 5. These estimates 
imply conclusions very different from those of Ehrlich. Neither of the 
deterrence variables have significant coefficients and, in fact, the 
coefficient of AVSENT is positive. Note, further that MIGR, URB, and 
BRHO appear to have a strong effect on the crime rate. These three 
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variables were not included in Ehrlich's analysis. Forst also replicated 
Ehrlich's analysis, as closely as possible, using the 1970 data. He 
does not present specific results but notes that the estimated elasticities 
of the two deterrence variables are substantially smaller than Ehrlich's. 
It is diff.icult to judge how different things are since no standard errors 
are provided. More will be said when we present our analysis of this data 
set. It must be pointed out again that Forst provides no assessment of 
f f h . d 1 .d f . R2 1 the it o is mo e, asi e rom reporting va ues. 
Table 5 goes about here 
The data set that we used in the analysis of the 1970 data was 
identical to that of Forst with the exception of three variables, Y!roP, 
YDSPR, and UMPL. We took YIPOP to be "Personal Income" and this data was 
obtained from the Statistical Abstract (1975). In computing YDSPR we 
took the national poverty level to be $3,601 as given in the Statistical 
Abstract (1975). The other discrepancy was for UMPL, which was supplied 
by Forst, but our average value is different than that given by Forst. 
Using the same model as Forst, we derived the estimated coefficients for 
the crime rate equation given in Table 5. Our estimates are similar to 
Forst's with only the estimates of the coefficient of UMPL being 
substantially different. Note that our estimate of the PJ coefficient is 
in fact positive although there is no strong evidence, in either case, of 
the actual coefficient being different from O. Our residual analysis 
indicated that Michigan might be a possible outlier in Michigan, (it had a 
standardized residual of 2.6). Although testing this point as an outlier 
using a Bonferroni t-test (see Miller, 1966) will not lead to rejection, we 
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reestimated the parameters with this state omitted and found that they did 
not change substantially. Scatter plots of the variables indicated that 
the District of Columbia {due to very high values of NWITE, BRHO, and POL$) 
and Alaska (with a very high percentage of males) were well away from the 
center of the array of independent variables. However, eliminating either 
or both of these points does not change the results either. One final 
point of note is that there was a tendency for the variance of the 
residuals to increase with URB. However, no heterscedicity was observed 
against N. 
In Table 6 we also give estimates for the coefficient when the model 
has all variables in logarithms and when only CR is in logarithms. Again 
the seemingly important variables remain the same. In both of these models 
there are no outlier problems nor is non-constant variance apparent. 
Hence there is evidence that the logarithmic scale is the better one to 
work in although it doesn't affect the findings meaningfully. 
As mentioned above, Forst replicated Ehrlich's model as closely as 
possible and obtained results for these 1970 data that were not consistent 
with Ehrlich's. We have also done this but our results do not agree with 
either Forst or Ehrlich. The estimates we obtained are given in Table 6. 
The only significant variables in our analysis are MFY and YDSPR. 
Evidently the slight differences between Forst's variables and ours are 
giving very different results. The residual plots for this model, 
however, showed a definite need for fitting the additional variables, 
URB and MIGR, so we would not want to use the model as it stood, for making 
inferences. 
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Table 6 goes about here 
Despite these discrepancies, our conclusion is the same as that of 
Forst; using variables measured similar to his, there is no evidence that 
in 1970 sanctions were an effective deterrent to crime. 
The explanation for the discrepancy between Ehrlich's results for 1960 
and Forst's ones for 1970 may be simply that behavior patterns of criminals 
charged in the ten years from 1960 to 1970. While certainly a possibility, 
this cannot reasonably be inferred from the data at hand. In comparing 
the two analyses, it must be remembered that the 1970 data includes only 
an overall crime rate and there has been no individual analysis for 
different crimes. Of course, we can compare the two results in terms 
of the overall crime rate but this may not be very fruitful as there are 
surely different structural relationships for different crime types which 
are masked by an aggregation. 
c. Other Analyses of Cross-sectional Data for Murder 
Given the wide spread interest in the potential deterrent effect of 
capital punishment on the commission of homicide, several investigators 
have done special analyses of cross-section data by state, specifically for 
this crime. These include Passell (1975) who examines data for 1950 and 
1960, Forst (1977) who analyzes data for 1960 and 1970 (actually he used 
differences), Ehrlich (1977b) who uses data for 1940 and 1950 (this analyses 
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of murder for 1960 were described earlier in this section), and Loftin 
(1977) who examined a quite different data set for 1960 explored earlier 
by several sociologists. Because the longitudinal analyses described in 
the next section deal only with homicide, we defer a discussion of these 
cross-sectional studies until the end of that section. 
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VI. DETERRENCE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2 AND MURDER 
Ao Ehrlich's Longitudinal Data for Murder 
One of the most controversial studies in the area of deterrence is 
that of Ehrlich (1975a)o Based upon a time series of aggregated national 
data from the years 1933-1969, Ehrlich claims to have found strong evidence 
that the death penalty has a deterrent effect upon potential murderers. 
In this section we review Ehrlich's analysis as well as prominent 
criticisms of it that have been made in the literature. We then present 
the results of our reanalysis of es~entially the same data set. 
Ehrlich's model· is one in which the murder rate, probability of 
apprehension, and probability of conviction given apprehension are 
endogenous variables having simultaneous effects on each other over 
time, while a number of socio-economic variables are considered to be 
exogenous variables along with the probability of execution given 
conviction. The murder supply function, by an elaboration of the 
arguments of Section 3.1 now replaces p* and f* of equation (3.2) by 
P (the probability of arrest), P \ (the probability of conviction given 
a c a 
arrest), and P \ (the probability of execution given conviction. The 
e C 
empirical implementation of this function, using the variables described 
in Table 7, takes the form: 
(6.1) 
Note that T (time) is entered into this equation differently from all the 
other variables. Time is used here as a surrogate for the improvement 
of medical technology over time, and as a variable it plays a crucial 
role in the analysis, as we shall see below. 
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Since the observations all involve aggregate national data measured 
annually for 1933-1969, Ehrlich assumes that the errors are subject to 
first-order serial correlation, i.e. 
(6.2) 
where p is the serial correlation and the et are independent random 
errors. The equation whose coefficients he thus sets out to estimate is 
(6.3) 
where 
(6.4) 
Table 7 goes about here 
In a simultaneous equation framework, one must be concerned with 
whether or not the structural equations are identified. This particular 
equation is identified by omitting a number of socio-economic variables 
from this equation. These variables that were omitted must have a 
direct effect on some of the other endogenous variables in order for 
equation (6.3) to be identified, i.e. for the parameters to be 
distinguishable. Fisher and Nagin (1978) point out the difficulty 
inherent in using socio-economic variables to identify the parameters in 
a structural equation. It is impossible to determine whether Ehrlich 
has validly identified his structural equations becaus'e he only presents 
the one equation given in (6.3). 
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Ehrlich presents estimates of the parameters in (1) using six 
different measures of P \ , the probability of execution given conviction. 
e C 
Two of these are defined in Table 7. In all but one of the six cases 
P \ is viewed as an exogenous variable. He finds that for all six 
e C 
measures the estimated coefficient of the P \ variable is negative. Also 
e C 
for four of the six the estimated coefficient is significantly different 
from zero (having at ratio smaller than -2). He also repeats the 
analysis after excluding some years from the beginning of the series and 
some from the end of the series. These modifications do not change his 
results appreciably. Using two of the estimates, Ehrlich derives an 
estimate of the average number of murders that would be prevented by one 
additional execution per year. He gives this estimate to be between 7 
and 8. 
Ehrlich concludes that his analyses show the deterrent effect of 
capital punishc.ent.· .He claims that he.has analyzed the data in 
scales other than the logarithmic one without the conclusions changing 
substiantially, and he also states that his results are unaffected by the 
time period of analysis. We show below that there is considerable 
doubt about these two claims. 
Criticism of Ehrlich's conclusions can be divided into two broad 
·categories: the relevance and accuracy of the data sources, and the 
methodology used. We address these in turn. The reliability of 
the data sources that Ehrlich used has been quest~oned before. In 
Section IV we noted the severe shortcomings of the UCR crime rates 
accurate measure of the variables that they claim to represent. 
Furthermore·Bowers and Pierce (1975) point out that the UCR arrest and 
clearance rates are especially suspect, primiarly in the earlier years. 
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What is particularly troublesome is that recording practices have 
changed so much over time. Moreover the UCR murder rates have been 
reestimated for the earlier years as noted in Section IV, but the arrest 
and clearance rates have not been so adjusted. When one is making 
inferences based upon a time series such dramatic changes in the 
coverage of data collection inevitably are confounded with any real 
effects that are present. 
A second data-related problem is conceptual as well. The variable 
P \ relates to crimes of murder subject to punishment of execution, 
e C 
actually a small proportion of all murders and one which varies from 
state to state. Yet the UCR data used by Ehrlich for the number of 
murders, the number of arrests, and the number of convictions 
refer to all murders and nonnegligent homicides rather than to only 
capital crimes. If both capital and noncapital murder rates have 
production functions of the form (6.1), then the overall murder rate 
cannot have a production function of this form (see the related discussion 
in Hoenack and Weiler, 1977). Ehrlich's discussion of this problem is 
noninformative and sidesteps the issues. 
The data used for P \ present further problems. In particular, the 
C .a 
data for P \ and XPOL were not available for odd years from 1933-1951. 
C a 
Ehrlich estimated these values by a regression technique that he does 
not describe. Among the many problems inherent in this type of procedure 
is the loss in real degrees of freedom due to the missing data. The 
effective degrees of freedom for estimation is an important issue here 
and more will be said about it later. 
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A fourth problem that Ehrlich faced was that there were no 
executions after 1967 so arbitrarily defined the number of executions 
in those years to be one in order to be able to take logarithms. This 
is indicative of a basic flaw in the production function model of 
equation (6.1). It is simply inappropriate for application to a social 
structure allowing zero executions, since it predicts an essentially 
infinite murder rate for such situations if the coefficient ~3 is 
negative. (i.e. the sign associated with a deterrent effect of capital 
punishment). 
An overriding issue related to the data is the choice of aggregate 
data 'for making inferences. Baldus and Cole (1975) include an excellent 
discussion of the dangers of making causal inferences using nationwide 
crime data. They note that crime patterns have differed over time 
from state to state as has the use of the death penalty. If murder 
rates increased in states that used the death penalty often, but rates 
decreased in states not using the death penalty, using nationwide data 
might completely obscure this. 
Assuming that the variables used in the study are faithful measures 
of what we really want to observe (which we believe to be untrue), there 
are still a number of methodological questions to be answered. Ehrlich's 
model is linear in the logarithmic scale (although he leaves T 
untransformed) and a number of authors have shown that the conclusions 
reached are dependent upon the scale of measurement. Passell and 
Taylor (1977) and Bowers and Pierce (1975), using data sets that are 
effectively identical to Ehrlich's, find that the coefficient of P I 
e C 
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is not significantly different from zero when estimated in a model that 
is linear in the original scale of measurement. Finally, we note that 
all of the variables actually used by Ehrlich are fallible measures of 
the variables of interest, and that the models of real interest should 
thus involve errors-in-the-variables, and multiple-indicator structures. 
The difficulties here are the same as those described in the last 
section. 
Another methodological question is whether the relationship between 
the actual variables used is changing over time. Passell and Taylor 
and Bowers and Pierce indicate that the data for years after 1963 exert 
heavy influence on the estimated coefficients. In their analyses, both 
show that the effect of P I is not significant when these later years 
e C 
are deleted from the data set. Passell and Taylor perform an F-test to 
determine if the regression function is the same for the years before 
1963 as for the years after 1963 and conclude that it is not. (Unfortunately, 
as Ehrlich (1977a) notes the properties. of their test statistic are not 
known.) Further, Bowers and Pierce argue that doing the analysis in the 
logarithmic scale gives more weight to these later years. In his rebuttal 
to Bowers and Pierce, Ehrlich (1975b) claims that there is no justification 
for arbitrarily deleting data points and that doing so loses precious 
degrees of freedom. While there is some validity to this, the deletion 
of these points is not arbitrary if a fundamental change in American 
society took place around 1963, as has been argued by many criminologists 
and sociologists. Moreover, as we found in our reanalyses described below, 
these years stand out as discrepant in various forms of residual analysis. 
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Klein, Forst, and Filatov (1978) consider a number of additional 
explanatory variables that Ehrlich might have usedo One is the average 
length of time served by convicted murderers - it may very well be that 
this is the important variable for explaining the increase in murders. 
Unfortunately, these data are not readily available. Another variable 
that they do use is an overall index of violent crime. The justification 
for its inclusion is that murder may be increasing as a by-product of 
an overall increase in the level of lawlessness. Reanalyzing Ehrlich's 
data, they find that with this extra variable in the structural equation 
the coefficient of P f is not significantly different from zero. 
e C 
Hoenack and Weiler (1977) reanalyzed the Bowers-Pierce data, using 
a fully specified simultaneous system of equations, a theoretical 
justification for which is given in Hoenack, Kudrle, and Sjoquist (1978). 
Their model interprets-Ehrlich's murder supply function as the 
societies response to murder behavior, not vice versa. For their 
speci~ication, the coefficient of the execution variable is positive 
although never more than one standard deviation from zero. A key feature of 
their specification is the separation or the variable A, the proportion 
of the population between the ages of 14 and 24, into two parts: one 
for the proportion of juveniles (ages 14-18) and one for young adults 
(ages 19-24). We also note that their alternative to (6.1) does not 
require the inclusion of T (its estimated coefficient is essentially 
zero when included); this point is especially interesting given the 
crucial role played by Tin Ehrlich's analysis and specification, which 
we discuss in detail shortlyo 
These criticisms raise a number of questions. The estimated 
coefficients differ depending on the scale in which the analysis 
- 38 -
is done, but which is the proper scale? The estimates are affected by 
the later years (1963-1969) but what distinguishes these years £roe the 
earlier ones? A further criticism deals with the basic formulation of 
the model as a simultaneous set of equations and the identification of 
the key structural equation for the supply of murders. We use a some-
what different approach in our analysis and try to answer some of these 
and other questions. 
In our analyses we have used data furnished by Bowers and Pierce 
and used in their analyses. Ehrlich consistently refused to make his 
data available to us. The only versions of the variable P \ that we 
e C 
had values for were PXQ1 and PXQ2• The bulk of our analysis focused 
on using either PXQ1 or its lagged values, PXQl-(-l), as a measure of 
probability of execution given conviction. 
Our first goal was to see if we could reproduce Ehrlich's results 
using this data set. In Table 8 we give our estimates, along with 
Ehrlich's, of the coefficients in the murder rate equationo Note that 
the signs of all coefficients agree but that there are some 
differences. The likely cause of the different estimates is in Ehrlich's 
estimation procedure based on the method of Fair (1970). We have 
programmed a method suggested by Fair ourselves to get estimates , while 
Ehrlich used a packaged routine. We suspect the problem is in how the 
modified first differences are created. Fair actually suggests a number 
of different methods, some of which are asymptotically more efficient 
,.. ,.. 
than others. The method that we adopted uses (Yt - pYt_1) as the values 
for the endogenous variables in the second stage regression. Thus in 
our analysis the effective years are from 1934-19690 Ehrlich appears to 
have used a somewhat different differencing operation which allowed an 
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analysis only for the period 1935-1969. At any rate, the conclusions based 
upon our estimates are not substantially different than Ehrlich's. A I11?-jor 
~ discrepancy occurs in the estimates of p. We found p = 0.55 while Ehrlich 
~ 
reports p = 0.257. Since our estimates were not very sensitive to changes 
in p (except near 1) we used Ehrlich's value to get the remaining estimates. 
Table 8 goes about here 
We take issue with Ehrlich's arguments for the endogenous variables 
Q.N' P, and P ·
1 
having simultaneous effects on one another. It makes 
a c a 
far more sense to us to think of a criminal's subjective assessment of 
punishment rates as affecting his current behavior, but that the murder 
rate effects the punishment variables after some delay of time. The 
delay might be six months, one year or even two; however, since the data 
only allow for delays which are multiples of a year, we have arbitrarily 
fixed on a delayed effect of murder rates on punishment of one yearo 
This assumption means that our system of equations, unlike Ehrlich's is 
recursive not simultaneous, and thus we do not have Ehrlich's identification 
problem, nor the problem of making inferences about structural parameterso 
Our model differs in this way from those used by Ehrlich, Bowers and 
Pierce, and Passell and Taylor, and we use it primiarly to make a series 
of methodological points. 
Our model for reanalysis is thus of the form: 
i = a0 + a1P8 + a2Pc\a + a3PX.Q1 + a4L + a5u + a6A + a7YP + a8T + a9c1 + e1 , (6.5) 
pa= bo + bl(~)(-1) + b2T + b3XGOV + b4XPOL(-l) + bsN + e2, (6.6) 
p 
c\a (6.7) 
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where the errors, ei' are assumed to be independent with mean O and 
variance a~. A subscript of (-1) indicates that the variable was lagged by 
l. 
one year. By assuming that the errors are independent we have set p = O. 
This zero value for the serial correlation is completely consistent with 
our findings in the replication of Ehrlich's results, greatly simplifies 
the estimation, and allows for detailed residual analyses based on standard 
methods for multiple linear regression. Those residual plots that we have 
looked at indicate that this assumption may not quite be met but we have 
reestimated the parameters assuming different values for the first order 
serial correlation coefficient and have found that the estimates do not 
change substantially. The residual plots indicated that the correlation 
might be of greater than first order but this possibility was not explored. 
If such higher order serial correlation exists, it effects Ehrlich's analyses 
as well as our own. 
Table 9 gives estimates of the coefficients in the murder rate equation 
for different transformations. Note that. the first two sets of estimates 
are for an equation that does not include C, the violent crime level index. 
We considered three difference measures of Pe\c: PXQ1, PXQl(-l)' and PXQ2• 
The only significant coefficients (whose t-values, which are gillen· in 
parenthesis, are in excess of 2) are for PXQ1 when variables are measured 
in the original scale or when only~ is measured in the logarithmic scale. 
These equations are the only ones to contain significant coefficients for 
the other punishment variables, namely PI • 
c 1 a 
Table 9 goes about here 
Bowers and Pierce (1975) conclude that Ehrlich's results are heavily 
dependent on the analysis being done in the-logarith~ic scaleo They state 
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that due to the very low number of executions after 1962, taking logarithms 
of PXQ1 emphasizes the effect of these later years thus yielding a negative 
coefficient which is significantly different from zero. Our conclusion, 
after studying the residual plot shown in Figure 2 as well as other graphs, 
is exactly the reverse. Taking the logarithm of PXQ1 moves the values of 
PXQ1 in later years far from the center and this is tending to flatten out 
the slope. These plots do, however, support the conclusions of Bowers and 
Pierce and Passell and Taylor that the years after 1962 do not fit the 
pattern of the previous ones. 
Figure 2 goes about here 
Other residual plots that we examined indicated a second problem which 
has not been noted in previous analyses. Large residual values corresponding 
to 1934, point to it as a possible outlier. Looking at the original data, 
we find that there is a very large value of PXQ1 and a small value of i· 
We suspected that this point might have a strong effect on the estimates 
so we reesti.mated the coefficients in both the original and the logarithmic 
scale. These estimates, given in Table 9, show that things do change 
considerably once 1934 is deleted. The estimated coefficient in the original 
scale is still negative but not significant while the estimate in the 
logarithmic scale is now positive. The residual plots after deletion of 
this point do not indicate any other outlier problems. We note that in 
Ehrlich's analyses, a significant result is obtained when using PXQl(-l) 
but not with PXQ1• With the lagged variable, PXQl(-l)' the value for 1934 
is used while for PXQ1 that year's data is excluded from the analysis. 
This seems to support our finding regarding the suspect nature of the 1934 
data. 
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It is not surprising that one point can exert such a strong effect 
on the estimated coefficients. Even in our recursive model there are 
only 25 degrees of freedom available for estimating the coefficients in 
the model. In Ehrlich's model the problem is much worse. Although Ehrlich, 
as well as other authors, have routinely computed the degrees of freedoc 
associated with their estimates it is not clear what the effective degrees 
of freedom actually are in a two-stage estimation problem. In Ehrlich's 
first stage regression there are eighteen independent variables in addition 
to the nine independent variables in the second stage regression. As far 
as we know there has been no work done on determining the appropriate 
degrees of freedom for this type of problem but we would think there are 
considerably fewer than twenty five. The difficulty in computing degrees 
of freedom is compounded by Ehrlich's estimation of the missing values of 
PI and XPOL using the remaining data. 
C a 
Table 9 contains only the results for equation (6.5) of our three-
equation model. We have analyzed the other equations as well but do not 
report on them here since they do not effect the deterrence hypothesis. 
Earlier we noted the arbitrary choice by Ehrlich of the use of 
logarithms for all variables but T, time. In Table 9 we show some equation 
where log Twas used in place of Tin a fully logarithmic specification. 
The changes in sign for the coefficient of PXQ that go with this change in 
specification are suggestive that the choice of scale for the variable T 
may have a strong influence on the coefficiento ~ow the arbitrariness of 
Ehrlich's choice hits home. -1 Why choose Tor log T instead of T , or 
log (T - 1900), or even log (T - 1776)? In other reanalyses we have discovered 
that suitable transformations of T can dramatically change the size and sign 
of the coefficient of PXQ1• 
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In summary, we find that these data do not support Ehrlich's conclusion 
that there is a deterrent effect created by an increase in the probability 
of execution. First, we find the model formulation suspect, and inappro-
priate for application in situations with essentially zero execution rates. 
Second, we question the choice of data used to measure key variables in the 
model. Third, we have noted that the analysis is sensitive to the specifi-
cation of the model. Using a recursive model we have obtained results that 
are different than Ehrlich's. The question of which model is more appro-
priate is not an easy question to ariswer, but we think that there is as 
much a priori support for our model as for Ehrlich's. Our residual analysis 
does not indicate any lack of fit other than the two problems discussed 
above; in contrast Ehrlich does not examine the goodness of fit of his 
model. Others, such as Bowers and Pierce (1975) and Hoenack and Weiler 
(1977), have also formulated alternative model specifications which when 
used in analyses make the deterrent effect of capital punishment disappear. 
In all there are far too many flaws in Ehrlich's model, his data, and his 
analyses for him to claim that a real deterrent effect of any sort has been 
found using this form of longitudinal data-structure. 
B. Cross-Section Analyses of Murder Rates 
To buttress the arguments in his paper on the analysis of the longi-
tudinal data on murder Ehrlich (1977a) has also analyzed the cross-sectional 
variations of murder and execution in 1940 and 19500 The basic regression 
model used in his analyses resembles equations (5.2), (5.3) and (6.3): 
ln(i) =a+ b1lnT* + b2ln(~) + b3lnPXQ + h4l~'"W 
+ b5lnX + b6lnW + b7lnA + b8lnU + e. 
(6.8) 
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Ehrlich uses ordinary least squares to estimate the coefficients in equation 
(6.8), and uses data first for states with positive executions, and then for 
all states. He also attempts to compare the results of a fully linear speci-
fication with (6.8), using an approach suggested by the method of Box and 
Cox (1964). His comparison strongly favors the log-log specification of 
{6.8). Ehrlich finds the estimated coefficient~ of T*, Q/C and PXQ (measured 
in several different ways) to be negative and significant at at least the 
0.05 level both for the linear and log-log specifications. His conclusion 
is that these data and the analyses of them corroborate his earlier analysis 
of the longitudinal data. 
As in Ehrlich (1975a) these conclusions seem at first sight convincing, 
until we note that the data used have even greater shortcomings than those 
noted earlier, and that almost all of the other analytical problems mentioned 
earlier remain. Moreover, Ehrlich's results run contrary to those of other 
investigators who have examined cross-sectional data. For example, Passell 
(1975) used 1950 and 1960 data to estimate the coefficients in the model, 
where I is the percentage of the family population below an arbitrary cash 
income poverty line, and Mis the ratio of net non-white migrants in the 
previous ten years to the total populationo Using both ordinary and two-
stage least squares he found positive {but not significant) estimated 
coefficients for PXQ, and negative (and significant) estimated coefficients 
for C/Q and T*o Passell's specification, unfortunately, has little more to 
recommend it than does Ehrlich's, but his results do illustrate the importance 
of the specification on the results, and the inferences one is likely to 
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draw from the analysis. 
Forst (1977) examined the change in the crime and punishment measures 
that occurred between 1960 and 1970 in each of the 32 states for which data 
on the variables he wanted to include in his analysis were available. 
Although his results appear to be in agreement with Passell, they are 
almost certainly dominated by the fact that PXQ for 1970 for all states 
was zero! To us, the logic of Forst's specification and analysis is highly 
suspect. 
Finally we note the analyses carried out by Loftin (1977) for 1960 
cross-sectional data using a markedly different set of variables aside 
~ 
from C/Q and TA, motivated primarily by sociological rather than economic 
considerations. Loftin finds little to support the inclusion of the 
punishment variables in a regression equation with either a linear or a 
log-log specification. 
We have concluded that these cross-sectional analyses offer no support 
to the conclusion that there is a deterrent effect of capital punishment, 
and the conflicting results for the other punishment variables, cast serious 
doubt on any attempts to infer deterrent effects. 
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VII CONCLUSIONS 
Becker's (1968) paper has stimulated many economists and others to 
use modern statistical methods for the analysis of regression and simul-
taneous equations models to search for evidence in support of the deterrence 
hypothesis. Following Ehrlich's (1973a, 1975a) pioneering attempts to 
implement Becker's theoretical model, the flood of papers and manuscripts 
on the analysis of crime and punishment data has been almost overwhelming. 
What has this work contributed to our knowledge of the deterrent 
effects of punishment on crime? We have concluded that little or no 
progress has been made during the past ten years in our understanding of 
the potential deterrent effects of punishment on crime. Indeed much of 
the controversy that erupted over Ehrlich's work has served to divert the 
efforts of serious scholars of crime from more productive pursuits to a 
battle with Ehrlich and his supporters. The battle has raged before the 
United States Supreme Court, which heard arguments based on Ehrlich (1975a) 
and Passell and Taylor (1977) in the case of Fowler v. North Carolina. It 
has filled the pages of many different journals. It has been investigated 
by a panel established by the National Academy of Sciences. And in the 
end we seem to be no further ahead of where we were ten years or more ago. 
In this paper, we have reviewed a large proportion of the empirical 
attempts to model the economics of crime and punishment, including the 
work of Ehrlich (1973a, 1975q) based on the model suggested by Becker (1968). 
We have seen that: 
(a) The Becker-Ehrlich model 'has glaring shortcomings, and when 
examined critically does not lead to the claimed testable hypotheses 
regarding the effect of punishment of crime. 
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(b) The use of the Becker-Ehrlich model for aggregate data requires 
extensive justification that has never been given. 
(c) The crime and imprisonment data used to empirically examine 
the Becker-Ehrlich model are so untrustworthy as to render any 
serious analysis meaningless. 
(d) The empirical implementations of the Becker-Ehrlich models 
are badly flawed and have extremely grave statistical shortcomings, 
and most published conclusions from them are not to be trustedo 
(e) Even if one accepts the Becker-Ehrlich model, and Ehrlich's 
choice of data to implement it (which we do not), Ehrlich's 
affirmative conclusions regarding the deterrent effect of 
punishment on crime in general, and of capital punishment on 
murder in particular, do not stand up to careful statistical 
scrutiny. 
We can find no reliable empirical support in the existing literature either 
for or against the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, we believe that little 
will come from further attempts to model the effects of punishment on. 
crime using the type of data we have described in this paper. 
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Figure 1: Why one-dimensional graphs do not always 
indicate influential observations. 
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Figure 2: Residual Plot for the Crime Rate Equation in (6.5) 
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Table 1: Variables Used in Ehrlich's Analysis 
Crime rate (the number of offenses known per capita) 
Crime rate lagged one year 
Estimated probability of apprehension and imprisonment 
(the number of offenders imprisoned per offenses known) 
Average time served by offenders in state prisons 
Median income of families 
Percentage of families below one-half of median income 
: Percentage of non-whites in the population 
Percentage of all males in the age group 14-24 
Unemployment rate of civilian urban males aged 14-24 and 
35-39, respectively 
Labor-force participation rate for civilian urban males 
ages 14-24 
Mean number of years of schooling of population 25 years 
old and over 
Percentage of population in standard metropolitan 
statistical areas. 
: Per capita expenditure on police in fiscal 1960, 1959, 
respectively 
Number of males per 100 females 
: Dummy variable distinguishing northern from southern states 
(south = 1) 
Note: A subscript j denotes that the variable is indexed by specific 
crime categories. 
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Table 2: Estimated Coefficients of Selected Variables in 
Equation (5.3). Estimates obtained by two-stage 
least squares. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
Offense Intercept (C/Q). T~ w X NW ] ] 
. 
Robbery -11.030 -1.303 -0.372 1.689 1.279 0.334 
(-1.804) (-7.011) (-1.395) (1.969) (1.660) (4.024) 
Burglary -2.121 -0.724 -1.127 1.384 2.000 0.250 
(-0.582) (-6.003) (-4.799) (2.839) (4.689) (4.579) 
Larceny -10.660 -o. 371 -0.602 2.229 1.792 0.142 
(-2.195) (-2.482) · (-1.937) (3.465) (2.992) (2.019) 
Auto Theft -14.960 -0.407 -0.246 2.608 2.057 0.102 
(-4.162) (-4.173) (-1.682) (5.194) (4.268) (1.842) 
Property Crimes -6.279 -0.796 -0.915 1.883 2.132 0.243 
(-1.937) (-6.140) (-4.297) (4.246) (5.356) (4.805) 
Murder 0.316 -0.852 -0.087 0.175 1.109 0.534 
(0.085) (-2.492) (-0.645) (0.334) (1.984) {8.356) 
Rape -0.599 -0.896 -0.399 0.409 0.459 0.072 
(-0.120) (-6.080) (-2.005) (0.605) (0.743) (0.922) 
Assault -7.567 -0.724 -0.979 1.650 1.707 0.465 
(-1.280) (-3.701) (-2.301) (2.018) (2.111) (3.655) 
Crimes against 1.635 -0.803 -0.495 0.328 0.587 0.376 
the person (0.380) (-6.603) (-3.407) (0.570) (1.098) (4.833) 
All offenses -1.388 -0.991 -1.123 1.292 1.775 0.265 
(-0.368) (-5.898) (-4.483) (2.609) (4.183) (5.069) 
- 56 -
Table 3: Estimated Coefficients of ln(C/Q). and lnT. 
(From Vandaele) J J 
(a) 
Eguation !·5.3} Eguation !5.32 Eguatioh !5. 3} 
Offense ln(C/Q). . lnT. ln{C/Q). lnTj ln{C/Q) . lnT. 
. J J J ] J 
Murder 
- .492(b) .124 -2.944 .129 2.178 .482 (- .35) (- .69) (-1.68) ( .35) ( .11) (- .11) 
Rape - .771 - .316 -1.347 - .699 -2.979 -1.240 
(-1.39) (-- .78) (-4.92) (-2.30) (- .43) (- .38) 
Assault -3.882 -7.216 - .968 -1.412 -·3.851 · 5. 754 
(- .35) (-· .37) (-3.37) (-2.36) { .22) ( .23) 
Robbery -4.223 -1.336 -1.584 - .465 -1.109 - .357 
(- .57) (- .50) (-6.49) (-1.46) (-2.19) (-1.24) 
Burglary - .445 - .793 - .884 -1.317 - .416 - .547 
(-2.73) (-2.99) (-6.05) (-4.91) (-2.81) (-2.43) 
Larceny -1.441 -2.127 -1.554 -2.287 -1.231 -1.637 
(-1.63) (-1.93} (-1.65) (-1.52) (-1.81) (-1.58) 
Auto Theft - .616 - .341 - .942 -1.063 - .650 - .246 
(-2.58) (-1.66) (-5.65) (-4.20) (-3.22) (-1.25) 
All Offenses -1.021 -1.156 -1.249 -1.407 -1.043 - .824 
(-3.84) (-3.4) (-5 .43) (-4.30) (-3.70) (-2.57) 
a) Model identified by the exclusion of ln{~} and ln{i) • 
59 59 
b) Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. 
CR:: 
PJ:: 
AVSENT 
QJ: 
POL$ 
COR$ 
MIGR 
URB 
BRHO 
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Table 4: Variables Used in Forst's Analysis 
Number of FBI index crimes per 100,000 residents 
Estimated probability of apprehension and imprisonment 
Average time served by offenders 
Expenditures on correction system per prisoner 
Expenditure on police per state resident 
Expenditure on correction system per state resident 
Population migration rate {population growth divided by nwnber 
of residents) 
Proportion of residents living in places defined as "urban" by 
the Census Bureau 
Proportion of households that are not husband-wife households 
MFY : Median family income 
YIPoP 
YDSPR 
UMPL 
TEEN 
MALE 
NWITE 
AVTMP 
South 
Income per capita 
Income dispersion (difference between median family income and 
national poverty level, weighted by proportion of families 
below poverty level) 
Proportion of the adult population that is unemployed or not in 
the labor force 
Proportion of residents between ages 18 and 20 
Number of males divided by the number of females 
Proportion of residents who are non-white 
Average temperature (Fahrenheit) 
Dummy variable distinguishing northern and southern states 
(South= 1) 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Crime-Rate Equation in (5.3) 
Forst Analisis Our Reanal:y:sis 
Variable ElasticitI: T-R.atio Elasticit:£ T-Ratio Coefficient* 
PJ -.02 .14 .oo .01 31 X 101 
AVSENT .01 .10 -.oo - .oo -46 X 10 -2 
. . 
QJ -.07 .64 -.06 .60 -16 X 10 -3 
MIGR 
* 
3.42 -.00 3.70 33 X 102 
URB .71 2.17 .74 2.40 26 X 102 
BRHO .96 2.13 .97 2.30 78 X 102 
MFY .60 1.51 .57 1.50 15 X 10-2 
YDSPR .40 1.93 .33 1.80 13 X 10-l 
UMPL .11 .21 .20 1.90 98 X 102 
TEEN .63 1.45 .69 1.70 30 X 103 
MALE .65 .65 .43 .20 21 X 102 
NWITE -.07 -1.51 -.07 -1.70 -15 X 10 2 
AVTEMP .11 .37 .21 a70 9.3 X 10 1 
* Not computed by Forst. 
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Table 6: Estimated Coefficients for Various Models 
Fit to Forst Data 
Variable . Model (ai Model (bl Model (c) 
,.. 
11 X 10-2 .42)(d) PJ ( 2.2 ( .22) 
- .21 
AVSENT -2 ( .13) -2 (- .30) 3.7 X 10 -1.9 X 10 .16 
QJ -3.9 X 10 -2 (- .20) -1.0 X 10 -2 (- • 77) 
MIGR 80 X 10-2 ( 3.33) 1.3 ( 3.17) 
URB 81 X 10-2 (: 2.46) 1.4 ( 2.75) 
BRHO 57 X 10-2 ( 1.12) 2.1 ( L31) 
MFY 1.2 ( 2.67) 97 X 10-G ( 2.11) 1.7 
YDSPR 62 X 10-2 ( 2.95) 73 X 10-5 ( 2.09) 1.0 
UMPL 31 X 10-2 ( 2.82) 4.9 ( 2.04) 
TEEN 91 X 10-2 ( 2.17) 20 ( 2.41) 
MALE -2.0 (- • 91) -2.5 (- .61) 
NWITE -6.9 X 10 -2 (-1.97) -.79 (-1.98) .04 
AVTEMP 33 X 10 -2 ( .92) 45 X 10-5 ( .76) 
(a) All variables, except SOUTH, transformed to natural logarithms •. 
(b) Only CR is transformed to natural logarithms. 
(c) This corresponds to Ehrlich's model using the 5 corresponding 
variables available in. this data set. 
p 
a 
L 
u 
A 
y p 
T 
NW 
N 
XGOV 
C 
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Table 7: Variables Used in the Time-Series Analyses 
Murder rate (per 1000 civilian population) 
: Probability of arrest (percent of murders cleared) 
Proportion of those charged that were convicted of murder 
: Number of executions for murder in the year t + 1 divided by 
the number of convictions in year t 
Number of executions for murder in the year t divided by 
the number of convictions in year t 
Proportion of the civilian population in the labor force 
Proportion of the civilian labor force that is unemployed 
: Proportion of population in the age group 14-24 
Friedman's estimate of (real) permanent income per capita 
in dollars 
Time (years) 
Proportion of non-whites 
Civilian population (in 1000 1s) 
Per capita (real) expenditures (excluding national defense) 
of all governments in millions of dollars 
Per capita (real) expenditures on police in dollars lagged 
one year 
Violent crime rate (offenses of rape, robbery and aggravated 
assault) 
. . 
a) 
b) 
I • 
,.. 
p Constant 
Ehrlich's 
Estimates 
.257 -3.176 
(- • 78) 
Our 
Estimates 
.257 -2.02 
(-2.61) 
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Table 8: Comparison of Estimated Coefficients in 
Equation (6. 3) 
p Pc\a PXQl u L y a p 
-1.553 - .455 - .039 .067 -1.336 1.481 · 
(-1. 99) (-3.58) (-1.59) (2.00) (-1.36) (4.23) 
- .56 - .25 - .038 .01 - .91 .65 
(- .55) (-1.57) (-1.24) (.26) (- • 71) (2.64) 
,.. 
*Note: Our estimate of p was actually p = • 55 but ·we present 
estimates using the same value as Ehrlich obtained for 
comparison purposes. Our estimates were not sensitive 
to changes in p except for p near 1. 
A T 
.630 
- .047 
(2.10) (-4.60) 
.71 - .02 
(2.28) (-2.6) 
Table 9: Estimated Coefficients for Equation (6.5) under Various Transformations 
Transformation(a) p Pela PXQl L u A y T C a p 
1 -1.60 - .089 .027 
-
.80 
-
.06 .91 -.05 .09 
(-1.65) (- .64) ( 1.08) (- .57) (-1.71) (2.94) (-.20) ( .82) 
2 
-
.75 
-
.15 
-
.043 
-
.42 .012 .63 .55 
-
.023 
(- .94) (-1.25) (-1.43) (- .32) ( .03) (2.17) (2.5) (-2.56) 
-5 -5 -4 
.23 -4 .015 -6 -4 9x10·8 3 -9.7xl0 •39xl0 -26xl0 
-
-5.lxlO 8.8x10 -18xl0 
(- .31) (-3.25) (-4.03) (-3.19) (-2.55) ( .30) ( .88) (-7.5) (9.0) 
4 -3 -3 .042 -3.6 -3 .622 -4 .033 -7 -1.lxlO -6.2xl0 
-
-8.7xl0 l.9x10 
-
15.7xl0 
(- .21) (-2.95) (-3.82) (-3.00) (-2.64) ( .68) (1.12) (-7.86) (6.28) 
2 - .070 • .017 - .015 - .930 - .031 .620 .320 - .026 .330 (- .08) (- .12) (- .44) (- .72) (- • 78) (2.21) (1.28) (-3.25) (1. 74) 
N 
-1.23 .o 37 .071 -1.3 
'° 
1 - .12 .94 - .44 .16 .34 (-1.26) ( .23) (1. 87) (- .93) (-2.4) (3.13) {-1.22) ( 1.33) {1.48) 
=============--- ----====================---=================== -
p p 
c.la PXQl~-ll L a u A y T C 2 
1 .76 -3 .035 .92 .03 .43 .44 .32 .02 - 3.8xl0 - - - - -{- .82) ( .03) ( - • 92) (- .66) (- .60) (1.59) (1.16) (-2.13) {- .10) 
3 -5 -5 -5 .18 -5 .039 -5 -4 9 X 10-8 -7 .6xl0 -16xl0 -73xl0 
-
-29xl0 l.3xl0 -17xl0 
(- .32) (-1.88) (-1.74) (-3.0) (-1.61) ( .93) (1.59) (-8.5) ( 9.00) 
===~======================== =-- --======= - -==========--============ 
Table 9 (continued) 
p pc\a PXQ2 L u A y T C a p 
1 
-1.2 
-
.12 
-
.027 -1.5 
-
.06 .58 
-
.001 .002 
- .10 (-1.20) (- .71) (- .68) (-LOO) (-LOO) (1.87) .(- .02) ( .02) (- .40) 
3 17xl0-5 -5 -5 .25 -5 .063 -6 -4 9 X 10-8 -19x10 -99xl0 
-
-65xl0 4.9xl0 -15x10 
( .43) (-1.27) (-1.14) (-2.63) (-2.6) ( .97) ( .38) (-5.00) < 4·.s) 
-============ - -====================== ================================- - ======= 
p p 
cla PXQl L u A y T C a E 
l(b) 
-
.99 .14 .063 
-
.64 
-
.084 .81 
-
.029 
-
013 .39 
(-1. 16) (1.00) (1.91) (- .49) (-1.83) (3.00) (- .• 09) (- .93) (1.95) 
M 
'3 (b) -4 -4 -4 -4 -5 9 X 10-8 
'° ~ 
-1.0xlO -1.8xl0 -7.6xl0 - .20 -4.0xlO .035 1.lxlO -.002 
(-.3.8) (-1.5) (-1.04) (-3.33) (-2.35) ( .78) ( 1.31) (-7.62) (9.00) 
a. Transformations are designated as follows: 
1. All variables in logarithms, 
2. All variables except Tin logarithms, 
3. All variables untransformed, 
4~ ~~ in iogarithms, all others untransformed. 
b. The data for 1934 was deleted in estimating the coefficients 
